Jonathan Geiger: Six Products, Three Exits, One Focus

Ending One and Starting the Next

Jonathan Geiger worked as a developer at a small startup while building his own products at night and on weekends. Of the six products he made over three years, he sold some and wound down others by refunding customers or releasing them for free. His independence came through a process of launching several products and deciding how to end or continue each one.

His first product, LectureKit, was sold while it had no recurring revenue. According to Geiger, the buyer of this product, which had been sitting idle for a while, chose to acquire it to save the time of building it himself. The sale price was $7,000. Even a product that was not earning a monthly subscription had value as finished software in a transaction.

WaitListKit got one pre-order customer, but Geiger had no will to keep developing it, so he refunded the money. NextUpKit earned $400 without any particular marketing, but he later released it as free and open source. He did not keep every product as a paid business just because it generated a small amount of revenue.

Starting from Competitors Already Earning

Geiger then changed his criteria for choosing products. He looked for competitors in markets he understood that were already making money, and examined whether he could offer customers a different choice. APIs for web data collection and automation fit those conditions.

CaptureKit was an API service that saved screenshots of web pages as images and extracted data from pages. Customers sent a web address and received results they could use in their own programs. The service took on the work of running a browser directly and managing whether pages displayed correctly. What Geiger sold was a web collection function that other developers could put into their own products.

Within a few months, CaptureKit gathered more than 300 users and 7 paying customers. The monthly recurring revenue (MRR) Geiger published at the time was about $130, and the sale price was $15,000. It was still a small business, but it had real users and payment records, which led to his second sale.

When moving from CaptureKit to SocialKit, he reused the login, payment, API key management, documentation structure, and landing page framework. The new focus was features for handling social media data. The common foundation he built while finishing one product reduced the development burden for the next.

Bringing Customers In Through Search and Content

SocialKit was a service that turned social media content into data other programs could use. Sending a video address from YouTube or TikTok returned the transcript, a summary, engagement metrics, and more. Customers could cut down on the work of assembling platform-specific data collection and video analysis functions separately. The business that handled web pages in CaptureKit led to one that handled social media content.

SocialKit's early revenue grew slowly. Its first month's MRR was $13, and the fifth month was $370. In a record published about a year after launch, MRR reached about $2,500, with one-time purchases adding about $700 to $1,000 a month. It took several months of operation to move from a few payments to revenue that could contribute to living expenses.

The actual buyers were broader than he first expected. Geiger thought developers would be the main customers, but he explained that a large share of paying users were people who automated their work with no-code tools. For them, the explanation of the API itself mattered, as did the way to connect it to tools like Zapier to complete the task they wanted.

To understand its users, SocialKit also put a short survey in the service screen. The survey, built with Embeddable, asked about the user's job and what they were building with the API. When responses came in, he received the content by email and also checked their willingness to take part in a customer case study. The information gathered this way became material for setting feature priorities and creating explanations and use cases suited to each customer type.

Pricing combined a usage-based credit subscription with one-time credit purchases. New users tested the features with 20 free credits and had to pay to keep using it. Customers who used it regularly could choose a subscription, and those who used it intermittently could buy as much as they needed. In practice, one-time purchases made up a share of SocialKit's monthly revenue that was hard to ignore.

For customer acquisition, he focused on search traffic. Even during development, he created per-feature landing pages, use cases, and pages explaining alternatives to competing products. He wrote one or two related articles a week, choosing topics based on the questions customers actually searched. It was a way of stacking up content so that visitors would come in through search after launch as well.

A free subtitle extraction tool also became an entrance for customers. Some of the users who found the tool through search moved on to the paid service. He put usage videos on the blog and rewrote the same content for LinkedIn or Reddit. By reusing one piece of explanation in several formats, he saved time on content production.

A Publishing API and a Partner

In April 2026, he launched PostPeer. PostPeer offered posting and scheduling across several social media platforms through one API. Its main targets were developers who wanted to add customer-facing posting features to their services, and agencies managing multiple accounts. Where SocialKit handled reading content, PostPeer handled sending it out, addressing adjacent demand.

Co-founder Yoav Mendelson took part in PostPeer. It was a product that had to handle different authentication methods and integration procedures for each platform. The two split the platform integration work, and Yoav continued PostPeer's development while Geiger focused on SocialKit.

PostPeer's early revenue growth was faster than SocialKit's. The MRR Geiger published grew from $34 in April 2026 to $1,370 in June and $2,018 in mid-July. He explained that he applied the search content strategy he learned from SocialKit to the new product more quickly. The customer acquisition methods he learned running the earlier product could be used for the next one too.

Selling One and Focusing on What Remains

In July 2026, Geiger quit his job and devoted himself to the product business. The combined monthly revenue of the two products he reported in that month's interview was about $6,400. Of that, subscription revenue was about $5,200 and one-time payments about $1,200.

The next month, on August 6, 2026, he announced the sale of SocialKit. Around the sale announcement, the active subscriptions he reported were 117, and MRR was about $3,300. The deal totaled $85,000, combining a $75,000 business sale price and a separate $10,000 consulting fee. It was his third sale after LectureKit and CaptureKit.

In announcing the SocialKit sale, Geiger said he would focus on PostPeer with Yoav. He had launched several products, but he did not choose to keep operating all of them. In his portfolio, launches and sales went together, and each time he wound down a product he regained time to put into the next business.