Bazzly: the Reddit marketing tool that fixed customer churn first

Choosing a Problem People Will Pay For Again and Again

Filip Panoski spent seven years building more than five side projects, and together they brought in only $100. Self-taught as a developer, he quit a job that paid $7,000 a month and lived on his savings to give business another try. The product he started then was Bazzly.

Among those failures were a consumer productivity tool and a business-facing launch platform that charged one-time fees. Drawing on his experience struggling with churn and with finding new buyers, he chose a business product that solved a recurring task and charged a subscription. With the next product, he decided first why customers would keep paying.

Bazzly's job is finding potential customers on Reddit. It helps small software businesses spot questions or requests for recommendations related to their product and then write suitable replies and direct messages. A post looking for alternatives to a given service, for example, is a chance for the business that solves that problem to meet a customer. Bazzly grew toward automating the work of continually finding and answering those conversations.

Before starting development, Panoski built a product landing page and a waitlist form. Contacting individually the people on Reddit who were discussing related problems, he found out which pitch drew a response and which communities made customers easiest to find. He has said that 30 waitlist signups gave him the confidence to start building. After testing how to approach customers first, he finished the first product within a month.

He gathered early users by talking to them directly as well. By his account, he had about 15 trial users before he added payments, and the first paying customer came the day after he began charging. Over roughly the next month, monthly recurring revenue reached around $100. At a time when he had no large audience or ad budget, individual outreach was a channel that let people try the product and brought back their reactions too.

Fixing First Why Customers Leave

After that first revenue, however, things stalled. New customers arrived while existing ones canceled at the same rate, so meeting more customers barely raised monthly recurring revenue. In a retrospective published in February 2026, Panoski said that for about three months he focused on reducing churn rather than on expanding acquisition. He had to find out first why people who had already shown interest stopped using the product.

He asked churned customers what they had expected, what actually fell short, and under what conditions they would have stayed. What the conversations revealed were a complicated initial setup, the time it took to see results, and messaging that pulled in customers who did not fit the product. So he simplified the start, removed confusing features, and focused development time on the features people actually used. He reworked both how the product was presented and what happened after signup.

The landing page copy, too, was taken back from conversations with customers. The headline stated the result the user would get, and the text beneath it explained clearly who the product was for. He also tested wording that invited people to look at how it worked, instead of wording that pushed them to sign up. Repeated phrases from support inquiries, cancellation reasons, and direct messages became the material for rewriting the product description.

In the first-use experience, he reduced the input burden. He changed it so that when users entered their product's address, AI prefilled the settings needed to get started. Panoski says this change cut a setup that used to take more than ten minutes to under 60 seconds. Since users who did not experience value at the outset did not come back even when the trial was extended, reducing what had to be done right after signup mattered.

Re-engagement emails, too, were tied to real events. He sent notifications when a new potential customer was found or a result was ready to check, giving users a reason to open the product again. The judgment was that a change tied directly to the user's work matters more than a routine check-in message. He counts these notifications as a main device that bridges early use and paid conversion.

Expanding From Direct Sales to Content

Once customers started staying longer, he expanded sales through individual outreach again. In a growth write-up published in March 2026, he said this approach raised monthly recurring revenue to about $300, and that adding content that organized what he had learned brought it to $1,000. The raw material for the writing was customers' frequent questions, the reasons they hesitated to buy, and the pitches that led to actual payments. Sharing what he gained from running the product on Reddit and X widened the points of contact with new customers.

On Reddit, he also paid attention to conversations that keep being read through search. He looked at posts seeking alternatives or asking for a tool suited to a particular task, and left useful answers even on discussions already surfacing in Google search. The approach was to explain a solution that matched the question and find the place where his product belonged. In his experience, those answers kept connecting search visitors even after the reaction to the post on the day it was published had passed.

On the pricing structure, he cut the number of options. He retired the early $19, $39, and $99 monthly plans and moved to a single $99 monthly plan that offered every feature. Existing customers kept their rates while new customers were given the new price. The selling approach that had let people choose a cheaper plan by feature was simplified along with it.

After monthly recurring revenue reached $1,000, the workload of handling everything alone constrained growth. Panoski offered a partner a 50 percent share of revenue, and together they rebuilt the product around full automation. Two months after the relaunch, monthly recurring revenue had grown to $5,000. The growth at this stage was a result made together with the partner.

Growth Numbers and Platform Risk

In an interview published in July 2026, the monthly revenue he stated was $7,500. Of that, $5,000 was monthly recurring revenue and $2,500 came from one-time purchases such as additional usage. The structure let customers keep a base subscription and buy more as needed.

Afterward, the combination of a base subscription and sales of additional usage continued. As of September 2026, the selling price on the official site is $199 a month, providing 170 credits each month and inviting customers to buy more when they fall short. So customers keep the service relationship as a subscription while increasing their spending according to how much they actually use. This is the selling arrangement that followed the $99 single plan described in the July interview.

As of 14:56 on September 26, 2026, the public TrustMRR page showed Bazzly's monthly recurring revenue at $14,848 and its active subscriptions at 103. The page states that it verifies revenue by linking to Stripe. It is not, however, a figure that reflects personal income after operating costs and the partner's share, so it cannot be counted as the money Panoski takes home each month.

When assessing the durability of the business, the dependence on Reddit deserves a look as well. Bazzly sells not only automated replies and direct messages but also features that increase upvotes, and it advertises that there is no account-ban risk. Reddit prohibits unwanted bulk contact and vote manipulation, so how these automation features are used risks conflicting with platform rules. No public record of sanctions against Bazzly could be confirmed, but whether the service can stay within what the platform allows remains an open business condition.

From Failure to the Next Business

The change worth noting in Panoski's case lies in the criteria for choosing the next product and the order in which he fixed post-launch problems. He tested whether he could reach customers, fixed why the customers who arrived were leaving, and then expanded a sales method that worked. For a first product's failure to help the next business, that experience has to turn into concrete decisions about customer selection and product operation. Bazzly is a case where that change connected to real revenue.